WHEN THE COURT DIVIDES:
RECONSIDERING THE PRECEDENTIAL
VALUE OF SUPREME COURT
PLURALITY DECISIONS
MARK ALAN THURMON
INTRODUCTION

When the Supreme Court decides a case, the Federal District
Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeals are responsible for finding
the governing rules of law in that decision. The first lower court
to deal with the issue often "defines" the holding of the case by
reviewing the reasoning found in the Supreme Court's opinion.
Other lower courts then rely largely on this interpretation. Plurality decisions' greatly complicate this process because lower courts
not only have to find the rationale of each opinion, but must also
decide which opinion's rationale governs. With all these choices, it
"more to confuse
is not surprising that plurality decisions often do
2
the current state of the law than to clarify it."

1. A plurality decision is a case without an Opinion of the Court: A majority of
the Court's members agree on the result, i.e., which party prevails-plaintiff or defendant,
petitioner or respondent-but there is no majority agreement on the reason for that
result. The Justices write several concurring opinions, explaining their differing views. If
one of these opinions receives more votes than the others, it is designated the plurality
opinion. For the purposes of this Note, plurality decisions are cases in which there is neither explicit nor implicit agreement among a majority of the Justices on a proposition
necessary to reach the result. This definition includes those decisions in which' there is no
plurality opinion, i.e., no opinion that is joined by more Justices than join any other
concurring opinions. However, this group does not include either "false plurality" decisions, in which the concurring Justice or Justices do not join the plurality opinion but
adopt essentially the same line of reasoning, or "dual majority" cases, which contain two
distinct majorities, one supporting the result and the other supporting a rationale. See,
e.g., Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24
U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (1956) (analyzing various types of no-clear-majority decisions and
considering their treatment by subsequent courts); Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial
Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1130-32 (1981) (describing "false plurality"
decisions). For an illustration of the distinction between plurality and dual majority cases,
see Appendix B.
2. John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in
the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 62.
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Traditionally, only the results of plurality decisions were considered authoritative? At first, this limitation was rarely questioned, as the Supreme Court rendered fewer than twenty noclear-majority decisions before 1938. 4 As plurality decisions became more common, however, courts began to deviate from the
traditional approach.' Many courts simply followed plurality opinions as though they were Opinions of the Court;6 other courts
looked for a logical connection or implicit agreement between the
plurality and concurring opinions;7 and still other courts remained
true to the classical view, limiting plurality decisions to their resuits.' With no guidance from the Supreme Court on the propriety
of these different approaches, plurality decisions frequently gave
rise to "collective confusion as to what [was] held by the Court."9
Undertaking to end this confusion, the Supreme Court adopted the "narrowest grounds" doctrine in Marks v. United States."°
The Court explained the doctrine as follows:
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, "the hold-

ing of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds

...

One way to determine the "narrowest grounds" is to look for the
opinion "most clearly tailored to the specific fact situation before

3. See, e.g., HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
135-36 (1912); EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES § 48 (Boston, Little, Brown

& Co. 2d ed. 1894). Other common law jurisdictions have taken the same approach. See
RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 84-93 (4th ed. 1991)
(discussing precedential value of no-clear-majority decisions of the House of Lords and
other multi-member appellate tribunals); G.W. Paton and G. Sawer, Ratio Decidendi and

Obiter Dictum in Appellate Courts, 63 L.Q. REv. 461, 465-70 (1947) (discussing practice
in Australian courts); see also Fellner v. Minister of the Interior, 4 S.AFR. L. REP. 523
(App. Div. 1954) (holding that in South Africa stare decisis does not apply to reasoning
supported by less than a majority of the sitting judges).
4. See Comment, supra note 1, at 99-100 & n.4.
5. Id. at 154-56 ("[T]hese practices [subsequent treatment of no-clear-majority cases]
do not accord with the theory put forth in the texts.").
6. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.

7. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
8.

See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.

9. Davis & Reynolds, supra note 2, at 62.
10. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
11. Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
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the Court and thus applicable to the fewest cases, in contrast to an
opinion that takes a more absolutist position or suggests more general rules. ' 12 The "narrowest grounds" doctrine will "identify as
authoritative the standard articulated by a Justice or Justices that
would uphold the fewest laws as constitutional" or "that...
would invalidate the fewest laws as unconstitutional."13 The Marks
rule, therefore, is intended to limit the precedential reach of plurality decisions, while ensuring that they are followed by lower
courts.
Unfortunately, the Marks approach does not always work. Its
failings are not surprising, given the lack of analysis of plurality
decisions in the Marks opinion, which merely makes a passing
reference to the line of no-clear-majority decisions on obscenity
that were issued between 1957 and 1973.' A more careful study
of plurality decisions is needed-an analysis grounded in the same
fundamentals that are implicit in our interpretation of clear-majority decisions should not only improve the consistency of result in
cases that follow a plurality decision, but should also reconcile
interpretive doctrines.
This Note considers the operation of the Marks "narrowest
grounds" doctrine, and concludes that the Marks rule is insupportable and should be rejected. It develops a more broadly applicable
and analytically sound approach to Supreme Court plurality decisions. Part I addresses the problems that arise when a single authoritative proposition must be found in the pronouncements of a
multi-member tribunal. This Part emphasizes the difficulty in finding such a single rule of law when a plurality decision, with its
multiple opinions, is rendered.15 Part II considers the practical
application of the Marks rule, and shows that the "narrowest
grounds" doctrine has significant shortcomings. These practical
failures are related to the Marks rule's analytical deficiencies. In
Part III, an alternative to the Marks rule is developed. This approach is a hybrid: It limits the binding authority of plurality decisions to their specific results, while recognizing and ranking the
12.

Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions,

80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 763 (1980).
13. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 694 (3d Cir.
1991), affjd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).

14. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193-94.
15. This Note focuses on the lower courts' task of interpreting and following the
Supreme Court's fragmented decisions.
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persuasive authority of the various propositions found in such
cases. In Part IV, this hybrid approach is applied to several cases
previously analyzed under the Marks rule. This Part shows that
the hybrid approach provides a reasonable and workable alternative to the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine.

I. RATIO DECIDENDI AND A MULTI-MEMBER COURT
Few would dispute that lower courts must follow the decisions
of the Supreme Court. 6 Stare decisis and the hierarchical nature

of our judiciary demand that lower courts abide by the pronouncements of their superiors. 7 However, this apparently straightforward requirement masks an onerous practical problem: How is an
inferior tribunal to determine which pronouncements warrant
precedential respect? To answer this question requires a return to

traditional principles of jurisprudence. This Part briefly explains
the origins and development of Anglo-American interpretive doctrine. It then focuses on the breakdown of traditional interpretive

approaches when multi-member Courts issue multiple opinions.

16. Some commentators, however, have questioned this obligation and have offered
several justifications for lower court deviation from seemingly authoritative Supreme
Court decisions. See, e.g., Margaret N. Kniffin, Overriding Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FoRDHAM L. REV. 53 (1982);
Note, The Attitude of Lower Courts to Changing Precedents, 50 YALE L.J. 1448 (1941);
David C. Bratz, Comment, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L. REV. 87 (1984); Note, Lower Court Disavowal of
Supreme Court Precedent, 60 VA. L. REV. 494 (1974).
17. Stare decisis should be distinguished from hierarchical, structural obligations. Stare
decisis is simply a jurisprudential version of the common-sense notion that things decided
should not be unsettled. While there are many important reasons for adhering to precedent in the name of stare decisis, this doctrine does not require or create an absolute
obligation to follow earlier decisions. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 571, 595-602 (1987) (discussing the arguments most frequently given in support of
stare decisis-fairness, predictability, efficiency, and stability). In contrast, the absolute obligation of a lower court to abide by the decisions of its superior courts is derived from
the structure of the judiciary, rather than from traditional stare decisis concerns. Although
lower court disavowal of certain authoritative Supreme Court propositions might not
undermine the stability of the judicial system, and in fact might even enhance stability in
certain settings, the lower court must still follow the Supreme Court's holdings. In this
sense, it seems incorrect to call this obligation stare decisis. See, e.g., Patrick
Higginbotham, Text and Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
411, 411-12 (1988) (noting the distinction between procedurally binding rules and stare
decisis. "While these rules may incidentally serve purposes similar to the purposes of
stare decisis, their primary purpose is to cope with the increasing size and output of the
courts and to manage the mechanics of judicial decisionmaking.").
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Origins and Development of Interpretive Doctrine

Early legal scholars divided judicial decisions into two parts:
the ratio decidendi (reason for deciding) and obiter dictum (stated
by the way)." This basic distinction limits a case's authority to its
ratio decidendi, which is comprised'of the postulates or conclusions
necessary to reach the result in that case. This conservative position derives from the function of the common law judiciary to resolve only the dispute before the court. 9 The difficulty lies in
determining what constitutes binding ratio and what is merely dictum, as judges seldom describe their rulings using these terms.
A technique for finding the governing doctrine of a case was
provided by Eugene Wambaugh, a prominent English legal scholar
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:
In order to make the test, let him first frame carefully the supposed proposition of law. Let him then insert in the proposition
a word reversing its meaning. Let him then inquire whether, if
the court had conceived the new proposition to be good, and had
had it in mind, the decision could have been the same. If the
answer be affirmative, then, however excellent the original proposition may be, the case is not a precedent for that proposition,
but if the answer be negative the case is a precedent for the
original proposition and possibly for other propositions also ....
In short, when a case turns ont only one point the proposition or
doctrine of the case, the reason of the decision, the ratio
decidendi, must be a general rule without which the case must
have been decided otherwise.'

18. See, e.g., WAMBAUGH, supra note 3, §§ 11-13. See generally JOHN C. GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAWV (2d ed. 1921); Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930); Herman Oliphant, A Return to
Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928).
19. The same principles guided the formulation of the "case or controversy" requirement found in the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see JAMES
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 539 (Norton
1987) (1893). See generally David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" View of
Judicial Review, 42 DUKE LJ. 279 (1992).
20. WAMBAUGH, supra note 3, at §§ 11-12 (footnote omitted). As an example of
how to apply Wambaugh's technique, consider the holding in Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957). This decision concerned the conviction of Roth for mailing obscene materials, under the federal obscenity statute. The Court held "that obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." Id. at 485. Because the Court
found no error in the lower court's conclusion that the materials mailed by Roth were
obscene, it affirmed his conviction. Wambaugh's test may be utilized to determine whether the quoted view of the Court concerning obscenity and the First Amendment is the
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All propositions that do not satisfy Wambaugh's test are merely
dicta. Wambaugh's method, based on principles of judicial restraint, remains useful for determining which portions of a decision warrant precedential respect.
During the first half of the twentieth century, several English
legal scholars attempted to refine Wambaugh's method. The most
significant and lasting contribution was made by Professor A.L.
Goodhart in his important article, Determining the Ratio Decidendi
of a Case. Goodhart emphasized the importance of determining
which facts the judge deemed material.' According to Goodhart,
the authoritative ratio decidendi of a case is the proposition or
propositions required to reach the result in that case given the
facts as seen by the judge. The judge's perspective and analysis
of the facts must be used, as they formed the basis for the deciratio decidendi of the case. If we "insert in the proposition a word reversing its meaning," that is, if the Court had instead stated that obscenity is within the area of constitutionally protected speech, would Roth's conviction still be affirmed? No, such a conviction
would be inconsistent with the First Amendment. Therefore, without the proposition that
obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment, Roth would have "been decided
otherwise." The exclusion of obscenity from the First Amendment is a ratio decidendi of
Roth.
21. WAMBAUGH, supra note 3, §§ 13-16; see also CRoss & HARRIS, supra note 3, at
52.
22. Wambaugh provided four principles to guide the search for a ratio decidendi:
First Principle: the Court's Duty to decide the very Case: Hypothetical
Cases. The first key to the discovery of the doctrine of a case is found in the
principle that the court making the decision is under a duty to decide the very
case presented and has no authority to decide any other.
Second Principle: the Court's Duty to follow a general Rule .

. .

. iT]he

second key to the discovery of propositions of law, is the principle that the
court must pass upon each case precisely as it would pass upon a similar case,
that is to say, in accordance with a general rule.
Third Principle: [t]he very Words of the Court not the Doctrine of the
Case. Accordingly, the third key to the discovery of the doctrine of a reported
case is the principle, or rather the caution, that the doctrine of the case is not
the language of the judges. In so far as the words of the judges go beyond the
precise doctrine necessary to the decision, laying down a different rule or a
broader rule, they are mere dicta.
Fourth Principle: Doctrine in the Mind of the Court: Necessity for Deliberation: . . . This fourth principle is, that a case is not a precedent for any
proposition that was neither consciously nor unconsciously in the mind of the
court. It is the duty of the court to deliberate ....

What makes decisions of

value as precedents is the fact that they are based upon reasoning and not
upon chance. If it can be shown that there was no deliberation, it follows that
the case is of no authority for any proposition whatever.
WAMBAUGH, supra note 3, §§ 5, 7, 16, 17 (footnotes omitted).
23. Goodhart, supra note 18.
24. See id. at 169-74.
25. Id. at 169.
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sion. Goodhart considered the expressed reasoning of the judge

important, for this reasoning provided valuable insight into which
facts the judge felt were material. However, Goodhart explained,
the judge's reasoning may not reflect the binding doctrine of the

case as many important rules of law result from faulty reasoning,
and moreover, some reported decisions simply contained no rea-

soningY
Goodhart's writings on ratio decidendi set off a flurry of activ-

ity among English legal scholars.' Goodhart's critics focused on
his refusal to accept a judge's expressed reasoning as governing 9
Goodhart's and Goodhart's critics' approaches to determining the
ratio decidendi of a case have been described, respectively, as
prescriptive and descriptive? Goodhart's approach is prescriptive,

because it looks for the logically necessary proposition, the rational
link between the judge's view of the facts and his decision.

Goodhart's critics' approach, on the other hand, is descriptive,
holding that "the ratio decidendi is the rule or principle that the
precedent-setting court considered to be necessary for its deci-

sion. '' "' At least one commentator argued that the two rationes-the prescriptive and descriptive-would converge.'

But a

26. Id. at 174-78. Goodhart summarized his approach to finding the ratio decidendi
as follows:
(1) The principle of a case is not found in the reasons given in the opinion.
(2) The principle is not found in the rule of law set forth in the opinion.
(3) The principle is not necessarily found by a consideration of allthe ascertainable facts of the case and the judge's decision.
(4) The principle of the case is found by taking account (a) of the facts trehted
by the judge as material, and (b) his decision as based on them.
(5) In finding the principle it is also necessary to establish what facts were held
to be immaterial by the judge, for the principle may depend as much on exclusion as it does on inclusion.
Id. at 182.
27. Id. at 165-69.
28. See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 771, 794 nn.99-100 (documenting debate over Wambaugh's and
Goodhart's approaches to determining the ratio decidendi); Earl Maltz The Nature of
Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 372 n.21 (1988) (same).
29. See, e.g., CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 3, at 67-69.
30. See, e.g., Collier, supra note 28, at 795.
31. Collier, supra note 28, at 799 (footnote omitted); see also CROSS & HARRIS
supra note 3, at 67, 72-74 (noting that "the distinction is one which does not need to be
drawn in the majority of cases"); Julius Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22
MOD. L. REV. 597, 600-03 (1959); Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical
Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 183, 184-88 (Laurence Goldstein ed., paperback
reprint ed. 1991) (1987).
32. See, e.g., A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 413
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variant of Goodhart's approach seems to have prevailed: "The
ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or impliedly
treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion,
having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him, or a necessary part of his direction to the jury."'
B. Finding a Ratio Decidendi 4 in a Plurality Decision
"The ratio decidendi is a conception that is peculiarly appropriate to a single judgment."' Several of the early scholars who
considered the problems of finding the governing doctrine recognized the limitation this principle represents with regard to plurality decisions.' When a multi-member tribunal hears a case and
issues multiple opinions, determining the ratio decidendi is a twostep process. First, the ratio decidendi for each opinion must be
determined.' Second, the various rationes decidendi are compared
to determine the extent of agreement between the concurring
opinions. When all or a majority of the members of a court agree
on a particular rationale, this two-step process, although tedious, is
not problematic. However, when such agreement cannot be found,
it may be impossible to find a ratio decidendi?6
It is also noteworthy that Anglo-American judicial systems,
9
with their unique emphasis on stare decisis and ratio decidendi,"
have structures that exacerbate these difficulties. Our use of multimember appellate courts significantly complicates the process de-

(1957); A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MoD. L. REv. 453 (1959).
33. CRoss & HARRIS, supra note 3, at 72.
34. The use of the singular ratio decidendi here must be emphasized. Finding such a
ratio for each concurring opinion does not, or at least should not, end the analysis. The
phrase "a ratio decidendi of the case," refers to the final, single, authoritative doctrine of
the case.
35. CRoss & HARRIS, supra note 3, at 85.
36. See WAMBAUGH, supra note 3, at 47-50; Goodhart, supra note 18, at 165,
167-68.
37. The ratio decidendi is found by using the rules explained above in Section A.
38. This is why the traditional view limited the precedential authority of these cases
to their results. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
39. "[T]he doctrine of the binding precedent is of such importance that it may be
said to furnish the fundamental distinction between the English and the Continental legal
method." A.L. Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 LAW Q. REV. 40,
42 (1934). See generally Fred W. Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied, 21 WASH. L. REv. 158 (1946)
(discussing the frequent mid-twentieth century reversals of United States Supreme Court
decisions, and the status and efficacy of the modem doctrine of stare decisis).
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scribed by Wambaugh and Goodhart. The United States' nine-Justice Supreme Court is an *extreme example. When the Supreme
Court-the Court with the largest number of jurists per panel of
any normally configured American court" (as well as the greatest
responsibility for pronouncing authoritative doctrine)-divides, it
can be exceedingly difficult to find any single authoritative rule of
law in the Court's decision. Multi-member tribunals can avoid this
difficulty, however, by issuing a single Opinion of the Court. This
practice, adopted by Chief Justice Marshall in the early nineteenth
century,41 allows multi-member Courts to approximate the single
judge model used in the discussion of ratio decidendi in Section A.
Several authors have noted the benefits of this practice over the
traditional practice of delivering seriatim opinions. ' Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court has been unable to consistently reach the
consensus necessary to exploit these advantages.
When the Supreme Court does not deliver an Opinion of the
Court, it moves away from the approximation of the single judge
model and significantly increases the burden on lower courts that
are required to follow its decisions. Consequently, it becomes
"impossible to avoid something in the nature of arbitrary rules to
meet cases in which several judgments are delivered."43 The
Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine is such an arbitrary rule,
adopted to approximate the precedential effect of an Opinion of
the Court. To operate successfully, the Marks rule must be universally applicable and involve the same analytical approach as that
used to interpret single majority opinions. Part II considers whether the Marks doctrine can satisfy these requirements.
H. THE MARKS "NARROWEST GROUNDS" DOCTRINE
The Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine represents an effort
to reconcile the problems created by a fragmented multi-member
Court with the potential advantages of a single majority opinion."
40. Although most of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have more members than the
Supreme Court, these courts normally sit in panels of three. When one of these courts
sits en banc, the problems described in this Section are even more evident.
41. See Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of
Judicial Disintegration,44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 192-93 (1959).
42. See, e.g., CRoss & HARRIS, supra note 3, at 84-85; Neil MacCormick, Why Cases
Have Rationes and What These Are, in PRECEDENT IN LAW, supra note 31, at 153,
170-71; Paton & Sawer, supra note 3, at 483-85.
43. CROSs & HARRIS, supra note 3, at 85.
44. The Supreme Court's fragmented decisions leave lower courts with little guidance,
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To perform this reconciliation, the Marks rule should employ the

same type of interpretive tools used by Wambaugh and
Goodhart.'

The Marks "narrowest grounds" rule should also be

universally applicable, accounting for decisions in which there is
agreement upon a particular line of reasoning, as well as those

decisions in which such consensus is lacking. Further, any doctrine
for interpreting plurality decisions should provide guidance for
those cases in which the Justices do not even address the same
issues, because such cases frequently lack the consensus necessary
to create an Opinion of the Court.
This Part evaluates the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine
against these standards. Section A discusses the analytical founda-

tions of the Marks rule and concludes that it is unsound. Section B finds that the Marks rule does not satisfy the standard of
universal applicability. It presents, in particular, cases in which the
Justices do not even address the same issues. The Marks approach

provides no useful guidance to lower courts tasked with interpreting these difficult decisions. Section C discusses the consequences
of the Marks rule's shortcomings.
A. Justificationsfor the "Narrowest Grounds" Doctrine
Two justifications for the "narrowest grounds" rule are frequently put forth. One justification, which this Note calls the "implicit consensus" model, looks for implicit agreement or logical
connection between the reasoning contained in the opinions of the
concurring Justices.' The rationale underlying this justification is
that "it constitutes a least common denominator upon which all of
the Justices in the majority agree, even though some would support the decision on broader grounds."' 7 The second distinct justi-

leading to inconsistent treatment of similar issues by these courts. See infra subsection
II(A)(1) and Section II(B). Further, Supreme Court plurality decisions produce breaks in
authority when a later Court adopts a new position upon reconsideration of the issue
that was before the plurality Court. See infra subsection II(A)(2). These results produce
uncertainty, inhibit reliance, and undermine respect for the judicial system. See, e.g., Davis & Reynolds, supra note 2, at 66-75; Note, supra note 1, at 1128-30. Decisions containing an Opinion of the Court are less likely to lead to similar problems.
45. See supra Section I(A).
46. The distinction between reasoning and result must be emphasized. Agreement on
the result is not a valid indicator of agreement on the reason for that result. In the extreme case, the concurring Justices may consider completely different issues dispositive.
See infra note 134.
47. State v. Novak, 318 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Wis. 1982) (footnote omitted).
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fication, which this Note calls the "predictive" model, is based on
the idea that "[t]he principle objective of this Marks rule is to
promote predictability in the law by ensuring lower court adherence to Supreme Court precedent."'
This Section presents a closer examination of these models,
and concludes that neither is supportable as a justification for the
Marks rule.'9 First, it discusses the "implicit consensus" model and
cases that rely on this justification. Examining the Supreme Court's
development of the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine, it demonstrates that the Marks Court misconstrued prior precedent and
inadequately considered the problematic nature of plurality decisions. This Section then discusses the "predictive" model for the
"narrowest grounds" doctrine. The failure of the "predictive" model is due primarily to the Supreme Court's refusal to apply the
Marks rule when addressing its own fragmented decisions.
1. The "Implicit Consensus" Model. The "implicit consensus" justification of the "narrowest grounds" rule maintains that
there is a common thread running through the reasoning of the
concurring opinions in a plurality decision. This "least common
denominator" indicates implicit agreement among the Members as
to the grounds for the result and allows a lower court to impute
consensus on the reasoning employed, thereby lending the imprimatur of an Opinion of the Court to the "narrowest grounds"
opinion.' Nevertheless, when such agreement actually exists, there
is no need to apply the Marks doctrine; any ratio decidendi endorsed by a majority of the Court is binding. 1 Moreover, when
genuine accord is lacking, the "implicit consensus" model degenerates into a "constructive consensus" model; use of the "narrowest
grounds" doctrine in such cases will often associate Justices with

48.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.

1991) (emphasis added), affd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
49. The analytifal underpinnings of the Marks doctrine are commonly relegated to a
footnote. The justifications for the rule are important, however, as they frequently form
the starting point for a lower court's search for the "narrowest ground." Unfortunately,
many courts simply make passing reference to the Marks rule and then indiscriminately

apply the technique.
50.

See, mg., King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert.

denied, 112 S. Ct. 3054 (1992).
51. Applying the Marks rule to such "false plurality" decisions will point to the ratio
decidendi. This results because the narrowest opinion will define the outer limits of the

majority agreement. See infra subsection III(B)(2).
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propositions they expressly rejected. The Marks Court attempted
to avoid this problem by arguing that the "narrowest ground" is
logically enveloped by broader positions. However, an examination
of cases in which the "implicit consensus" justification of the "narrowest grounds" doctrine seems valid will illustrate the falsity of
this assertion.
a. Marks and Memoirs. 2 The Marks Court used the
"narrowest grounds" technique to determine the governing rule of
law from a line of badly splintered decisions on the constitutional
definition of obscenity.53 Two decades earlier, in Roth v. United
States,' the Court had declared that "implicit in the history of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance."'55 With this declaration, the Court
began a decade-and-a-half-long process of ittempting to provide
useful guidance on what constitutes obscenity.'
In Memoirs, the Court held, in a 6-3 decision, that the book
at issue, Fanny Hill,' was not obscene, and therefore must be
protected by the First Amendment. The Court disagreed, however,
on why this book was protected by the First Amendment. Justice
Brennan, writing for a three-Member plurality, adopted a threepart test for obscenity. 8 This standard was based on the
52. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966) [hereinafter Memoirs].
53. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192-94 (1977). The question before the
Marks Court was whether or not the Memoirs plurality had changed the definition of

obscenity for First Amendment purposes. The Supreme Court used the "narrowest
grounds" doctrine to determine the governing definition of obscenity from Memoirs. This
application is seldom questioned; in fact, Memoirs is frequently used as a benchmark case
to support the "implicit consensus" justification of the "narrowest grounds" approach.
However, Memoirs marked the height of the Court's division on the question of obsceni-

ty.
54. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
55. li at 484.
56.

The Court finally resolved this issue in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973),

which established the following obscenity standard:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work,

taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, .

.

. ; (b) whether the work

depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-

fined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
57.

JOHN CLELAND, MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE (Peter Sabor ed., 1985)

[hereinafter FANNY HILL].
58.

The Memoirs test provided that the following "three elements must coalesce" for
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plurality's interpretation of the Court's earlier obscenity cases,
particularly the Roth decision. 9 As Fanny Hill did not satisfy the
plurality's rigorous obscenity test, these Members of the Court
concluded that the book must be protected by the First Amendment. Concurring in the result, Justices Black and Douglas each
rejected the plurality's approach and instead took an absolute view
of the First Amendment: Fanny Hill was protected by the First
Amendment whether it had any redeeming social value or not.'
Justice Stewart articulated a third view: equating obscenity, for
First Amendment purposes, with hard-core pornography, 1 he
found that Fanny Hill was not obscene, and therefore agreed that
it should receive First Amendment protection. The three dissenters
would have each applied a less stringent obscenity standard than
that of the plurality.'
Applying the "narrowest grounds" doctrine to the Memoirs
decision, the Marks Court declared: "The view of the Memoirs
plurality therefore constituted the holding of the Court and provided the governing standards."' Although the Supreme Court has
since provided little explanation of the Marks "narrowest grounds"
approach, several lower courts have referred to the various opin-

material to be found obscene:
[lit must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description
or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Warren, C.J., and Fortas,

J.).
59.

"Under [the Roth] definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements

must coalesce ...." Id.
60. Id. at 431-33 (Douglas, J.,concurring); id. at 421 (Black, J., concurring) (citing
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (Black, J.,dissenting); Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 515 (1966) (Black, J.,dissenting)). Justices Douglas and Black
read the First Amendment literally--"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ...." This interpretation does not allow any contentbased governmental regulation of printed materials. Therefore, these Justices disagreed
with the Court's decision in Roth to deny obscenity, however defined, First Amendment
protection. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-14 (1957) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); William W. Van Alstyne, FIRST AMENDMENT 5-6 (1991) (discussing the absolute view of the First Amendment).
61. Id. at 421 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (citing Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 497 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 518 (Stewart, J.,dissenting)).
62. Id. at 441-45 (Clark, J.,dissenting); id. at 456-60 (Harlan, J.,dissenting); id. at
461-62 (White, J.,
dissenting).
63. Marks, 430 U.S. at 194.
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ions in Memoirs as supporting the "implicit consensus" justification.' However, the two First Amendment absolutists-Justices
Black and Douglas-would never have accepted the plurality's
three-part obscenity test, or any other obscenity test for that matter. The conflict between Justice Stewart's "hard-core pornography" approach and the plurality's multi-part analysis is less conspicuous but still problematic. Although the outcomes of these
approaches may sometimes coincide,' the attempt to reconcile the
reasoning underlying these approaches strains the credibility of the
"implicit consensus" model. There was no majority consensus,
explicit or implicit, in Memoirs, concerning the appropriate obscenity standard.
A recent en banc decision by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit demonstrates the fallacy of applying
the "implicit consensus" justification to Memoirs.' Judge Harry
Edwards, writing for a seven-member majority, explained that "[iun
essence, the narrowest opinion must represent a common denominator.of the Court's reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment."'67
The D.C. Circuit also noted that the various opinions of the Memoirs majority fit this model: "Because Justices Black and Douglas
had to agree, as a logical consequence of their own position, with
the plurality's view that anything with redeeming social value is
not obscene, the plurality of three in effect spoke for five Justices:
Marks' 'narrowest grounds' approach yielded a logical result."'
But surely the D.C. Circuit could not have believed that Justices
Black and Douglas considered the plurality's test to be logically
consistent with their own absolute views of the First Amendment-especially when both of these Justices dissented from the
seminal Roth decision, which held that obscenity was outside the
reach of the First Amendment.' The Memoirs decision provides

64. See, eg., King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3054 (1992).

65. That is, items denied First Amendment protection by Justice Stewart's "hard-core
pornography" standard might correspond to those materials denied protection by the
Memoirs plurality's three-part test.
66.

King, 950 F.2d 771.

67. Id. at 781.
68. Id.
69. Justice Brennan wrote the Opinion of the Court in Roth and believed his Mem-

oirs position to be consistent with Roth. How can it be argued that Justices Black and
Douglas, who also claimed to be adhering to their prior positions, agreed with a position
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an excellent example of the type of "constructive consensus" that
the Marks rule frequently creates."
b. Delaware Valley II. A recent Supreme Court plurality decision that has led to frequent application of the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine is Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II)." Facing the
question of whether or not federal fee-shifting provisions could be
enhanced in contingency situations to compensate the prevailing
attorney for the risk of loss, the Court decided 5-4 to disallow the
enhancement at issue.' A four-Justice plurality held that such
enhancements were "impermissible under the usual fee-shifting
statutes."' However, in the final section of their opinion, in
which they considered what standards should govern if other
courts did not follow their absolute rejection of contingency enhancements, the plurality advised that such enhancements should
be severely limited.7 4 Justice O'Connor provided the deciding
vote, but refused to rule out all enhancements.' Although she
adopted a rigorous standard for awarding contingency enhancements that was similar to the plurality's proposal in the final section of their opinion, Justice O'Connor refused to join any part of

in Memoirs that they rejected in Roth, not to mention that they expressly rejected the
plurality's test in Memoirs?
70. Memoirs also illustrates the importance of the distinction between reasoning and
result. It may be true that the Memoirs plurality's obscenity standard will produce "narrower" results than the Black/Douglas approach-i.e., fewer items will be protected by
the First Amendment under the plurality's view. See generally VAN ALSTYNE, supra note
60, at 5-21 (discussing spheres of protection under the First Amendment). However, this
fortuitous overlapping of results says nothing about the logical consistency of these
Justices' views. Further, because of the disparities between the reasoning in the Memoirs
opinions, it is risky to use any one of those rationales to predict the Supreme Court's
position on analogous matters. For a more complete discussion of the Marks rule's inability to predict outcomes, see subsection II(A)(2). See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973) (considering the constitutional definition of obscenity and rejecting all the concurring positions from Memoirs); supra note 56 (presenting the Miller standard); infra note
91 (discussing reasons for the Miller outcome).
71. 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
72. Id. at 729 (opinion of White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Powell, and Scalia,
JJ.); ki. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 727 (opinion of White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Powell, and Scalia,
JJ.).
74. Id. at 728.
75. Id. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the plurality opinion.' The dissenting Members endorsed a more
liberal test for awarding enhancements.'
Lower courts have consistently treated Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Delaware Valley H as the "holding" of the Court."
Those courts employing the Marks approach have based their

adoption of Justice O'Connor's opinion on the apparent similarities
between her position and the plurality opinion's final section.79
However, when the plurality opinion is considered alone, its final
section could be regarded as dicta, for the plurality did not rely on
the reasoning in that section in rejecting the enhancements at issue
in Delaware Valley II.'"Therefore, applying the traditional methods of determining the ratio decidendi of a case" places the

plurality's absolute rejection of contingency enhancements in sharp
contrast with Justice O'Connor's limited acceptance of them.'
Delaware Valley H and Memoirs indicate that the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine cannot be justified by the "implicit consensus" model. In both cases, the "implicit consensus" justification

76. Id. at 735-42.
77. Id. at 740 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,
JJ.).
78. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) (collecting
cases that have followed Justice O'Connor's opinion from Delaware Valley II and noting:
"In our prior opinions interpreting Delaware Valley II, we, like other circuit courts, have
assumed that Justice O'Connor's concurrence controls."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3054
(1992). The D.C. Circuit, however, rejected this interpretation of Delaware Valley If by
adopting the plurality's view that enhancements should be absolutely rejected. Id. at 784.
In reaching this result, the court found the Marks rule inapplicable: "Because [Justice
O'Connor's] answer to that question [of how to calculate an enhancement award] is so
clearly at odds with that of the plurality, however, we are left without a controlling opinion or a governing test for awarding contingency enhancements under Delaware Valley
11." IL. at 783.
79. Id. at 777 ("[S]everal of our sister circuits have read Justice O'Connor's concurrence as implicitly agreeing with the plurality's statement that contingency bonuses should
be available only in 'exceptional cases.' ") (citations omitted); see also Islamic Ctr. of
Miss. v. City of Starkville, 876 F.2d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 1989) (following Justice
O'Connor's Delaware Valley II concurrence).
80. Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 727-28 (opinion of White, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Powell, and Scalia, JJ.).
81. The plurality's two positions-absolute rejection of contingency enhancement
awards or a limitation of such awards to "exceptional cases"-could be viewed as alternative rationes decidendi. Under this analysis, Delaware Valley H may be characterized as a
false plurality, with a majority adopting the "exceptional cases" limitation. See infra note
178 and accompanying text.
82. See, King, 950 F.2d at 777-78 (characterizing these views on the availability of
contingency enhancement awards as "'never!' for the plurality" and "'hardly everl' for
Justice O'Connor").
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seems valid; however, a closer examination reveals that it actually
is not, for in truly fragmented decisions there is no consensus on
the reasoning.
2. The "Predictive" Model. The "predictive" model offers a
more enticing justification for the Marks "narrowest grounds"
doctrine. This model maintains that "the controlling opinion in a
splintered decision is that of the Justice or Justices who concur on
the 'narrowest grounds,"' because this single legal standard may
be used to accurately predict what the Court would do when faced
with a similar factual situation.' Again turning to the Memoirs
decision, ' any material that fails to satisfy the plurality's stringent
three-part obscenity test will be held protected by the First
Amendment because the more absolute positions of the concurring
Justices would necessarily protect such matter, thereby comprising
a majority. If, on the other hand, material is determined to be obscene under the plurality's test, the dissenters would likely agree,
thereby comprising a majority. Therefore, although the plurality's
test in Memoirs was rejected by six Members of the Court, it was
decisive, because it was the narrowest position necessary to form a
majority, and thus should reliably forecast future results.
First, this subsection considers the analytical basis for the
"predictive" model and concludes that it is flawed. Then it examines lines of cases in which the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine has failed to accurately predict the outcome of future Supreme Court decisions. This failure can lead to discontinuity and
uncertainty regarding important legal principles because of the
break between prior interpretations of Supreme Court decisions by
lower federal courts and the Supreme Court's later, conflicting
resolution.
a. Analytical basis for the "predictive" model. The analytical failure of this explanation is quite subtle, requiring a recognition of the distinction between result stare decisis and rationale
stare decisis. Result stare decisis concerns only the specific outcome
of a case, whereas rationale stare decisis lends authoritative weight
to the ratio decidendi. In a clear-majority decision, both types of

83. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.
1991), affd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
84. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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stare decisis govern subsequent cases. According to the "predictive" model, the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine accurately
predicts the results in future cases and in that sense is an unremarkable application of result stare decisis. However, the Marks
rule takes this process one step further, affording full precedential

weight to reasoning that did not enjoy majority assent. The difficulty with this step is that this reasoning may then be applied to
situations that only partially resemble the matter that was before
the plurality Court. In such situations, the predictive ability of the
model fails, yet the reasoning will continue to be applied as a
governing rule of law.'

The failure of the "predictive" model is also attributable to
the Supreme Court's disregard for the "narrowest grounds" doctrine. The Court has cited Marks only four times for the "narrowest grounds" rule-three times in dissent.' This neglect is best
explained by considering the notions of horizontal and vertical
stare decisis.' Horizontal stare decisis-the precedential weight the
Supreme Court ascribes to its own prior decisions-does not absolutely bind the Court.' However, lower courts are bound by ver-

85. See, e.g., Santillanes v. United States Parole Comm'n, 754 F.2d 887 (10th Cir.
1985) (applying the Baldasar Court's analysis--see infra notes 117-26 and accompanying
text-to a forfeiture of parole). It should be noted that applications of the reasoning
from a prior case are necessarily by analogy; if the facts do not materially differ, the prior result would govern and the reasoning used to reach that result would be irrelevant.
86. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2855 (1992)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting, joined by White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.); Franklin v.
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 191 n.1 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and
Marshall, JJ.); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9
(1988) (referring to the Marks rule as "settled jurisprudence"); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 329 n.1 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and
Blackmun, J.). In Casey, the Court missed an opportunity to resolve the problems caused
by the rigid Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit relied heavily on Marks to determine the governing standard for reviewing abortion regulations under Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir 1991) (finding Justice O'Connor's "undue burden" standard the "narrowest grounds" in Webster),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Limiting its attention to the substantive issues, the Supreme Court failed to provide any further guidance on interpreting
its plurality decisions. Given the intensity of the debate surrounding the abortion decisions, the Court's focus on these issues is understandable, but it is unfortunate that it let
this chance to clarify legal issues slip by.
87. Stare decisis describes the obligation of a court to follow its own decisions and
the decisions of its peer tribunals. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
88. In fact, the Court's respect for its prior decisions varies with the issues involved,
with constitutional holdings receiving less respect on stare decisis grounds than statutory
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tical stare decisis; they must follow all Supreme Court decisions.'
Similarly, the Supreme Court regards the Marks rule as binding
lower courts, but does not believe that the "narrowest grounds"
doctrine can prevent the Court from reconsidering the issues it addressed in its earlier plurality decision. This view is undoubtedly
correct, for to bind the Court by its fragmented decisions while
allowing it to freely reconsider clear-majority cases would be absurd. Nevertheless, the Court's disregard for the Marks rule is not

without costs.
The Court's double-standard approach to the Marks rule undermines its predictive ability. When the Court reconsiders the
issues it addressed in a prior fragmented decision, it seldom considers the merits of following the "narrowest grounds" position
from that decision. If many of the same Justices who heard the
earlier case are still on the Court, it is not difficult to understand

interpretations due to the difficulty involved in altering a Supreme Court constitutional
interpretation through the amendment process. See Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1988) (erroneous constitutional precedents should be overruled unless "to do so would pitch the
country into the abyss-if to do so would cause such harm to the body politic that, in a
relative sense, it would be on the order of killing the body to save a limb"); James C.
Rehnquist, Note, The Power that Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345 (1986) (calling for an abandonment
of stare decisis in Constitutional adjudication); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis
and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988) (discussing the conflict
between originalism and stare decisis). But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422 (1988):
For a long time judges have said that statutes are different from common
law and constitutional law. Courts should attach a meaning to a statute, then
let Congress act or not; a court could only confuse Congress and increase uncertainty by revisiting the subject; Congress can correct mistakes. I doubt that
this is so.
Id. at 426 (footnote omitted). Judge Easterbrook also explains that judicial alteration of a
statute-e.g., by finding certain provisions unconstitutional and letting other parts
stand-may be difficult for Congress to undo. Various compromises and coalitions are involved in enacting a law; the provisions affected by the Court's interpretation may not
have enough support to alter that interpretation. In this sense, he proposes that statutory
interpretations by the Court be treated similarly to the Court's constitutional interpretations. Id. at 427-29.
89. "Vertical stare decisis" is a misnomer. Lower courts' obligation to follow the
rulings of their superior tribunals derives from structural rules that are based on the
hierarchical nature of the judicial system, not from the prudential considerations that
underlie stare decisis. These rules require a court to follow all the decisions of its superior courts. On the other hand, "horizontal stare decisis" describes the obligation of a court
to follow its own prior decisions. Only "horizontal stare decisis" is really stare decisis. See,
e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177, 177 n.1 (1989).
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why the Marks technique is not used. Most Justices will simply
adhere to their earlier positions.' On the other hand, if the Court
has experienced turnover since its prior plurality decision, new
Members, with several opinions from which to choose, frequently
adopt a position that cannot be characterized as the "narrowest
ground."'" In either situation, the determination not to follow the
Marks rule-not to allow, or even to encourage, the Court to
reconsider its fragmented decisions-tends to perpetuate, not eliminate, the confusion caused by these divided cases.
-

b. Practicalfailures of the "predictive" model. Elrod v.
Burns' and Branti v. Finkel' provide an example of the Marks
rule's inability to predict the outcome of Supreme Court cases. In
Elrod, the Supreme Court held that certain patronage hiring practices violated the First Amendment. The practices of the sheriff of
Cook County, Illinois were at issue in Elrod. After defeating the
Republican incumbent, the new sheriff, a Democrat, replaced
many non-civil service employees with political patrons. Although
the Court held that many of these dismissals violated the First
Amendment, no new rule of law received majority assent. Justice
Brennan, writing for a three-Member plurality, held that "the
practice of patronage dismissals is unconstitutional under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments . . . "' Concurring, Justice Stewart

would have limited the new rule to "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee[s]."" The dissenters rejected any

90. See, e.g., supra notes 60-61.
91. An excellent example of this result is presented by Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973), in which a majority of the Court rejected the Memoirs plurality's three-part
obscenity standard. A five-Justice turnover had occurred since Memoirs was decided;
Justices Warren, Clark, Fortas, Black, and Harlan left the Court and were replaced by
Justices Burger, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, respectively. Four of the five
new Justices (all but Justice Marshall) rejected the Memoirs plurality's obscenity test. Id.
at 23. It is also interesting that the Miller majority claimed reliance on the Roth standards, just as the plurality had done in Memoirs. Id. at 36-37; Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413,
418 (1966).
92. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
93. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
94. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White and Marshall,
J1.). Earlier in his opinion, Justice Brennan had apparently accepted that certain
policymaking employees might be properly dismissed on the basis of their party affiliation. He rejected the distinction, however, because "[n]o clear line can be drawn between
policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions." Id. at 367.
95. Id. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.).

PLURALITY DECISIONS

1992]

439

nonstatutory limitation on patronage hiring practices, relying on

the prevalence and acceptance of such activities throughout the
nation's history,' and pointing out that the complaining parties in
Elrod had received their jobs through the same type of partisan

systemY
Lower courts initially had little difficulty applying the Marks

rule to Elrod; they uniformly adopted Justice Stewart's concurrence as the "holding" of the Elrod Court.9 Justice Stewart's

"nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential" limitation narrowed the field

of unconstitutional patronage employment practices from the

plurality's more absolute position. Although it seemed that the
"predictive" model of the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine
would apply without problem in Elrod, the Supreme Court

promptly intervened to return confusion to this area of the law.
Just four years after the Elrod decision, the Supreme Court,

in Branti v. Finkel, again considered the constitutionality of politically motivated employment practices.9 The plaintiffs in that case

were assistant public defenders with political party affiliations
different from the newly appointed public defender. The District
Court for the Southern District of New York permanently en-

joined the public defender from terminating the plaintiffs on the
basis of their party affiliation." ° The court noted that Justice

Brennan's plurality opinion could be read as the authoritative
opinion from Elrod, presenting three reasons why "Elrod need not

be read so narrowly as the 'least common denominator' test would
suggest it need be."'' But this part of the district court's opinion

96. Id. at 375-76 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 376, 377-80 (Powell, J.,dissenting,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.).
97. Id. at 377.
98. See, e.g., Stegmaier v. Trammell, 597 F.2d 1027, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1979) (listing
courts and commentators that have considered Justice Stewart's narrow position to be the
holding in Elrod); Alfaro De Quevedo v. De Jesus Schuck, 556 F.2d 591, 592 (1st Cir.
1977) ("We need not pause long . . . to reflect upon the differences which separated the
justices, for it is clear that the opinion of the Brennan plurality represents the outermost
limit of the Elrod v. Burns restriction on partisan dismissals . . . ."); Loughney v. Hickey, 480 F. Supp. 1352, 1362 (M.D. Pa. 1979) ("Because the concurring opinion added the
element of 'nonconfidential', most federal courts have regarded it as narrower than the
plurality opinion and have followed it as the governing law."), vacated, 635 F.2d 1063 (3d
Cir. 1980), affd, 673 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir. 1981).
99. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
100. Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 598 F.2d 609 (2d
Cir. 1979), affd, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
101. Id. at 1289.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:419

was dicta, as the court went on to find that the plaintiffs were not
policymaking or confidential employees and therefore were covered by both the Elrod plurality and concurrence. The court held
for the plaintiffs and the Second Circuit affirmed.1"
On appeal, the Supreme Court also held for the plaintiffs.
Rather than affirming the lower courts and thereby adopting their
interpretation of the Elrod holding, the Court presented a new
rule for patronage hiring cases. Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, stated that "party affiliation is not necessarily relevant to
every policymaking or confidential position."1 The Court rejected Justice Stewart's more narrow position in Elrod, but the opinion was not written as though it overruled a precedent."°
Therefore, the Court implicitly rejected the Marks doctrine. More
to the point, the Court's new interpretation created a break in
authority with the lower federal courts' prevailing views of the
Supreme Court's position, thereby denying the validity of the
"predictive" justification of the Marks doctrine.
Teague v. Lane"° provides another example of the Marks
rule's predictive failure. At issue in Teague was the appropriateness of considering a changed procedural standard in a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner claimed that the Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky,"° which altered the evidentiary standard required to establish an invalid use of peremptory
challenges,"° invalidated his trial; to allow the petitioner to claim
the benefit of the procedural change would require its retroactive
application to collateral review cases."° The Court divided over
102.

Finkel v. Branti, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming without opinion), aff'd,

445 U.S. 507 (1980).
103. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.
104. Id. at 516-20. Justice Stewart, however, viewed the majority opinion as rejecting
his position from Elrod, and therefore dissented. Id. at 520-21 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).

105. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
106. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
107. Batson held that "an inference that the prosecutor used that practice [peremptory
challenges] to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race" would
support a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. A petitioner must also establish membership in "a cognizable racial group" and that the excluded veniremen were of the same group. Id. at 96.
108. The Teague plurality noted that if the new rule-based on petitioner's Sixth
Amendment claim-were not retroactive, petitioner would benefit from it, while others
similarly situated would not.
We therefore hold that, implicit in the retroactivity approach we adopt today, is
the principle that habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would be applied ret-
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the proper test for determining when retroactive application of a

changed procedural standard is appropriate. Justice O'Connor,
writing for the plurality, advanced a two-part test that would deny
retroactive application in most collateral review cases.1 Justice

White based his concurrence on the more general principles governing retroactive application of new criminal procedures in cases

on direct appeal, which, he concluded, did not mandate retroactive
1
application in collateral review situations."

Joined by Justice

Blackmun, Justice Stevens based his concurrence upon stare decisis;
the Court had decided in Allen v. Hardy... that Batson "cannot

be applied retroactively to permit collateral review of convictions

that became final before it was decided." ' These Justices rejected the plurality's attempt to define a far-reaching standard for all
collateral review cases."'
Under the Marks "narrowest grounds" rule, "the concurrence

by Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun, stating a somewhat dif-"
ferent test than the one formulated by the plurality, should be

binding precedent." '14 Courts that have applied the Marks rule to
1
Teague have generally followed Justice Stevens's concurrence."

But, disregarding the Marks rule, "the Supreme Court has adopted
the Teague plurality's test as governing law ....,
As the Elrod and Teague cases illustrate, the Supreme Court's

disregard for the Marks "narrowest grounds" rule undermines its
predictive ability. When the Supreme Court fails to follow the

roactively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two exceptions we have articulated.
Id. at 316 (plurality opinion).
109. The Court's new approach was to deny retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless: (1) the new rule "places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe,'" Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
672 (1971) (Harlan, J.,concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)), or (2)
failure to retroactively apply the new rule would "seriously diminish the likelihood of
obtaining an accurate conviction." Id. at 315.
110. Id. at 316-17 (White, J.,concurring).
111. 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (per curiam).
112. Teague, 489 U.S. at 322 (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.).
113. Id. at 318-22.
114. Elortegui v. United States, 743 F. Supp. 828, 830 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1990), affd, 943
F.2d 1317 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1229 (1992).
115. See, e.g., id. (citing Eleventh Circuit decisions regarding the Stevens concurrence
from Teague as governing).
116. Id. (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), and Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
407 (1990) as endorsing the plurality approach from Teague).
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result predicted by the Marks rule, it overrules a precedent, at
least from the perspective of the lower courts, which must attempt
to follow all of the High Court's decisions, even its plurality decisions. In contrast, the Supreme Court takes the view that it may
abandon the "narrowest ground" position without according that
position the deference normally provided a Supreme Court precedent. Lower courts should take the Supreme Court's rejection of
the Marks rule as an invitation to follow suit.
B.

Universal Application of the Marks Rule

In addition to having unsound analytical justifications, the
Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine is not universally applicable.
Marks provides no useful guidance in those cases in which different Justices take different approaches to the issues. Such decisions
cannot be forced into the Marks "narrowest grounds" mold because of the absence of any logical connection between the concurring opinions. This shortcoming is perhaps the most significant
practical problem of the Marks technique; courts unable to find
any logical connection between the opinions of the concurring
Justices in the Court's most fragmented decisions have taken a
random and unguided approach to plurality decisions that produce
widely varying results. This Section examines Baldasar v. Illinois,"7 which provides a particularly powerful illustration of this
problem.
In Baldasar, the Court addressed a unique application of the
right to counsel doctrine: whether or not a prior uncounseled
conviction could trigger a recidivist provision"' and thereby expose the defendant to an enhanced prison term. Baldasar, after a
second conviction for misdemeanor theft, faced an Illinois recidivist statute that treated subsequent offenses as felonies and subjected Baldasar to a sentence of one to three years imprisonment,
as compared to the one year maximum for misdemeanor theft. Although Baldasar had no counsel at his first trial, his conviction was
upheld, because he had only been fined, and governing Supreme

117. 446 U.S. 222 (1980). This per curiam decision, with three concurrences and a

dissent, is properly considered a plurality, because none of the rationales presented in the
concurrences received the assent of a majority of the Court.

118. A recidivist law exposes a criminal defendant to a harsher penalty due to prior
convictions. The term recidivist refers to "[a] habitual criminal; a criminal repeater."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 87, at 1269.
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Court decisions upheld uncounseled convictions unless the defendant received a prison sentence.119 At his second trial for theft,
Baldasar was appointed counsel and properly convicted.
The Supreme Court divided over whether or not to uphold
Baldasar's increased sentence. Four Justices-two concurring opinions were joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens-agreed that
application of the Illinois recidivist statute violated Scott. In his
concurrence, Justice Stewart stated that he would have held that
the increased sentence clearly violated the rule set down in Scott
v. Illinois.1 Justice Marshall elaborated on this position in his
concurrence:"' "That petitioner has been deprived of his liberty
'as a result of [the first] criminal trial' could not be clearer. If it
had not been for the prior conviction, petitioner could not have
been sentenced to more than one year for the present offense.""
In a separate concurrence, Justice Blackmun relied on his dissenting position in Scott. He believed that counsel should be required
anytime a "defendant is prosecuted for a non-petty criminal offense, that is, one punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment,"" and that therefore, Baldasar's prior conviction
was invalid and could not be used to activate Illinois' recidivist
provision." Although this position was accepted by no other Justice in Scott or Baldasar, Justice Blackmun did provide the necessary fifth vote in Baldasar, preventing the increased sentence.
The Baldasar dissent interpreted Scott as holding that any
conviction not resulting in imprisonment is valid for all purposes,
including the triggering of a recidivist law." Therefore,
Baldasar's prior conviction was properly used by the Illinois courts.
To hold otherwise, the dissent argued, would only confuse the
holding from Scott "that 'actual imprisonment [is] the line defining

119. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that an indigent defendant may not
be sentenced to imprisonment without the assistance of appointed counsel).
120. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by Brennan and

Stevens, JJ.) (citing Scott, 440 U.S. at 367).
121.

See id. at 224-29 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ.)

(citing Scott, 440 U.S. at 367).
122. Id. at 226 (quoting Scott, 440 U.S. at 372).
123. Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Scott, 440 U.S. at 389-90 (Blackmun,
. dissenting)). Misdemeanor theft was punishable by more than six months imprisonment
in Illinois. Id. at 230.
124. Id. at 230.
125. Id. at 230-35
Rehnquist, JJ.).

(Powell, J., dissenting, joined

by Burger, C.J., White,

and

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:419

the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.' ' This line
served as clear notice to sentencing judges: if the defendant is not
actually imprisoned, the conviction will stand with or without counsel. The dissent predicted that the Court's decision in Baldasar
would only lead to confusion.
The dissent's prophecy could hardly have been more accurate.
However, it is not the reasoning of the Baldasar opinions that has
given the lower courts difficulty. Instead, the confusion begins
when the lower courts attempt to apply the Marks "narrowest
grounds" doctrine to the Baldasar opinions. What is the "least
common denominator" from Baldasar?The concurrences of Justices Stewart and Marshall, which were joined by two other Justices,
employed the same, or at least highly similar, logic. Their reasoning, however, was sharply opposed by the dissent. Therefore, to
apply Marks properly, some common ground must be found between the concurring opinions of Justices Stewart and Marshall
and the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun. Imputing such
consensus is problematic at best.
Although "there does not seem to be any such least common
denominator among the Baldasar opinions,' '.. many lower courts
have attempted to force Baldasar into the Marks mold. The poor
fit is indicated by the different results reached. In Santillanes v.
United States Parole Commission," the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that Justice Blackmun's opinion was the holding
of the Baldasar Court. By respecting Justice Blackmun's attempt
to cling to his Scott dissent, the Tenth Circuit, then, not only undermined the majority position from Scott, but adopted from
Baldasar a position endorsed by only one Member of the Court.
An Alabama court reached a conclusion similar to the Tenth
Circuit's, holding that Justice Blackmun "agreed with the concurring view" of Justice Marshall and that "this rule [Marshall's] can
be carved out as the holding of the majority.' '29 However, the
Alabama court limited Justice Marshall's position to prior convictions punishable by less than six months' imprisonment, thereby
grafting Justice Blackmun's position onto the position embodied in

126. Id. at 231 (quoting Scott, 440 U.S. at 373).

127. State v. Novak, 318 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Wis. 1982).
128.

754 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1985). This position was also adopted by the North

Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 176 (N.D. 1985).
129.

Bilbrey v. State, 531 So. 2d 27, 32 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
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Justice Stewart's and Justice Marshall's concurring opinions."
The Tenth Circuit and the Alabama court represent a minority
view, however, as most courts have adopted Justice Marshall's
concurrence from Baldasar as governing." Yet Justice Marshall's
opinion was joined by only two other Members of the Court. Even
with Justice Stewart's concurrence, "the Court was evenly split
four to four over whether an uncounseled conviction which was
valid under Scott was valid for all purposes or invalid insofar as it
provided the basis for incarceration upon a subsequent conviction."'" In this sense, Baldasar could be treated as an affirmance
by an equally divided Court. 3
The inconsistent treatment of Baldasar is not unique; several
other Supreme Court plurality decisions have created similar confusion. These cases illustrate an important shortcoming of the130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Addvensky v. Gunnell, 605 F. Supp. 334, 338 (D. Conn. 1983); People
v. Olah, 298 N.W.2d 422, 422 (Mich. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 957 (1981).
132. State v. Novak, 318 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Wis. 1982).
133. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942) (holding that an affirmance
by an equally divided Court is of no precedential value). The Fifth and Seventh Circuits
have taken essentially this approach, limiting Baldasar to its facts and relying primarily
on Scott v. Illinois. United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1990); Schindler
v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068
(1984); see also David S. Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions after Scott and Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 517, 529 (1982) (questioning the
precedential value of Baldasar).
134. See, e.g., Badham v. March Fong Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (citing
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), which considered the constitutionality of state
redistricting plans). Badham provides the following description of the Bandemer decision:
Of the six justices who believed that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable, a plurality of 'four held that "a threshold showing of discriminatory
vote dilution is required for a prima facie case of an equal protection violation." Two justices dissented, expressing the view that "a state legislature violates the Equal Protection Clause by adopting a redistricting plan designed
solely to preserve the power of the dominant political party." Three justices
concurred in the result on the ground that partisan gerrymandering claims were
simply non-justiciable.
Id. at 668 (citations omitted). It is difficult to find a logical connection between the plurality and concurring views from Bandemer, as described in Badham above. See also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 884 (2d Cir. 1981)
(citing First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (Citibank
I), and stating, "the divergent views of the majority appear to provide no common
ground from which we may articulate a Citibank I rationale"). See generally Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989); and their progeny. As the Fifth Circuit quipped, "We frankly admit that
we are not entirely sure what to make of the various Bakke opinions. In over one hundred and fifty pages of United States Reports, the Justices have told us mainly that they
have agreed to disagree." United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir.
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Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine: When concurring opinions do
not address the same issues, there can be no common ground on
those issues. This obvious conclusion is of little consolation to
lower courts faced with the Supreme Court's rigid mandate: Thou
shalt find the "narrowest ground" in our decisions, even if we
ourselves were unable to do so.
C. Consequences of the Failures of the Marks Rule
The preceding analysis illustrates the failures of the Marks
rule. It produces inconsistent results in those cases that appear
amenable to the "narrowest grounds" technique. 3 ' It also fails to
reliably predict the outcome of Supreme Court decisions, largely
because of the Court's disregard for the Marks dictate." Finally,
in the large number of fragmented decisions with no logical overlap among their concurring opinions ("no common ground" cases),
the rule effectively leaves lower courts without guidance.'37
The Marks doctrine's practical and analytical shortcomings
undermine its ability to approximate the precedential effect of an
Opinion of the Court. Although there is a gain in efficiency when
lower courts agree on a "narrowest ground," it comes at the price
of stability. As the Elrod and Teague examples illustrate,'38 an
opinion's logical scope is not a reliable indicator of its ability to
garner the support needed to form a majority. Therefore, simply
following a narrow opinion does not enhance certainty or reliability. Further, the inconsistent application of the Marks rule undermines the integrity of the legal system. Courts recognizing these
shortcomings face an even more troublesome dilemma than that
caused by the fragmented decision: They can either perpetuate the
Marks legal fiction, recognizing that it provides only limited
practical improvement over a complete lack of guidance, or go
their own way, disregarding the dictate of a clear majority of the
Court.

1980).
135.
136.
137.
138.

See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra

subsection II(A)(1).
subsection II(A)(2).
Section II(B).
notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
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III.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE MARKS
"NARROWEST GROUNDS" DOCTRINE

The Marks rule fails to eliminate the problems caused by

Supreme Court plurality decisions. The Court's continual disregard
of the Marks procedure not only creates doubt about its viability,
but also undermines any stability and predictability it might produce. Moreover, many courts have recognized the limited applicability of the Marks rule and have refused to apply it to cases in

which they can find no "narrowest ground. 139 These courts
should reject such a counterproductive and arbitrary judicial tenet
rather than perpetuate this legal fiction and the problems it creates.
This Part presents an alternative method for identifying the

governing rationale in the Supreme Court's fragmented cases.
Section A discusses the development of the various methods used

historically to interpret plurality decisions. Section B introduces a
hybrid approach to interpreting plurality decisions, which integrates

the different methods explained in Section A. This alternative to
the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine is based on traditional

notions of precedent, tempered by the hindsight gained through
study of the "narrowest grounds" approach. It is intended to provide a universally applicable, coherent set of groundrules for find-

ing the authority in fragmented cases. Directed at the inferior
tribunals tasked with interpreting these plurality decisions, this

approach is a form of damage control rather than a corrective
measure. The responsibility for avoiding such "juridical cripples"

lies with the Supreme Court.1" Finally, Section C compares the

139. See, e.g., King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781-82 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3054 (1992).

140. See Davis & Reynolds, supra note 2, at 59 (noting problems produced by fragmentation of the Court, the causes of this division, and possible ways the Supreme Court
could avoid these difficulties); Douglas J. Whaley, Comment, A Suggestion for the Prevention of No-Clear-Majority Judicial Decisions, 46 TEx. L. REV. 370 (1968) (also focusing

on the reasons for such decisions and ways to avoid them); Note, supra note 1, at
1140-46 (attributing the frequent division on the Court to excessive value-oriented substantive reasoning).
The Court might also utilize the certiorari process to reduce the number of plurality decisions rendered. In many of these cases, different Justices simply address different issues. For an example, see the discussion of Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980),
supra Section II(B). This problem could be partially avoided by narrowing the questions
before the Court through the certiorari process. As a corollary to this point, it is also
recommended that the Justices abandon the practice of adhering to their dissents from
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hybrid approach to the Marks rule as analyzed in Part II, and concludes that this alternative method avoids many of the shortcomings of the Marks rule.
A.

Methods Used to Interpret Plurality Decisions

The Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine was a break from
the approach used by most lower courts to interpret Supreme
Court plurality decisions; prior to Marks, most lower courts treated
the Court's plurality opinions as authoritative. 1 ' Following plurality opinions from the Court's fragmented cases was itself a break
from the traditional approach, which limited plurality decisions to
4
their results."
This Section discusses the development of these
different approaches to Supreme Court plurality decisions.
The traditional view, which limited no-clear-majority decisions'
precedential value to their results-and the movement away from
the traditional view-is illustrated by the following excerpt from
an early empirical study by the University of Chicago Law School:
In summary, the "coordinate opinion" cases' have been cited
predominately for their general results. As has been suggested,
this is perhaps due to the presence of conflicting majority views
of approximately equal strength and the consequent absence of a
basis for choice between these views. Occasionally, however, the
presence of unequal numerical alignments appears to have caused
later*courts to use the cited decision for the view stated in the
plurality opinion. In this situation, there is of course some basis
for choice.'"
As divided cases became more common, more courts adopted
plurality opinions as binding.45 In fact, the courts in the numerous cases cited by the Marks Court in support of their "narrowest
grounds" interpretation of the Memoirs decision had adopted the
Memoirs plurality opinion as binding with little or no explana-

certioraripetitions. Once an issue has been properly brought before the Court, the Justices should forsake their views on the propriety of addressing that issue in order that the
matter be resolved. See supra note 134 (describing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109

(1986)).
141.

See Novak, supra note 12, at 774-75.

142. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
143. "Each of these cases contains more than one majority concurring opinion." These
opinions adopt distinctly different rules of law. Comment, supra note 1, at 101.

144. Id. at 114.
145. See Novak, supra note 12, at 774-75.
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tion.1" The implicit assumption of the traditional view is that an
opinion's precedential authority is directly proportional to the
number of Justices that join it.
The Chicago study also noted that plurality opinions in "relative disparity" cases, which were "characterized by an inequality of
scope between concurrences," were frequently followed. 7 Although such cases arguably contain a "narrowest ground," the
Chicago study indicates that these cases were cited either for their
results, in accordance with the traditional view, or for their plurality opinions.1" No cases were found that were cited for their
"narrowest grounds" opinions per se; in other words, when a "narrowest grounds" opinion was followed, it was not for the scope of
its reasoning, but only for its having received more support than
the broader concurring opinions.149 Courts that broke with the
traditional approach of limiting the Supreme Court's no-clear-majority decisions to their results rationed precedential authority to
opinions in proportion to the number of Justices that joined them.
The trend toward following plurality opinions is even more
strongly illustrated by the Chicago study's "narrow minority"
subgrouping of cases, which were "characterized by the presence
of a minority concurring opinion which is analytically not in conflict with the plurality opinion, except insofar as the plurality is
broader than the minority."1 " These cases present the sharpest
rejection of a "narrowest grounds" approach; the study found only
146. Marks, 430 U.S. at 194 n.8; see Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935, 937
(1st Cir. 1966) (stating simply that obscenity determinations must be "[g]uided by the
controlling opinions of the justices in the majority in the three cases decided March 21,
1966 in the Supreme Court of the United States [of which Memoirs was one] . . . as
well as [by] earlier cases such as Roth") (citations omitted), rev'd, 388 U.S. 449 (1967);
United States v. 35 Mm. Motion Picture Film, 432 F.2d 705, 713 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting
that the film in question "cannot be proscribed as obscene within the meaning of Roth

as explicated in Memoirs"); United States v. Ten Erotic Paintings, 432 F.2d 420, 421 (4th
Cir. 1970) (per curiam decision with passing reference to Memoirs); Huffman v. United
States, 470 F.2d 386, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (referring to the obscenity test as "The Roth-

Memoirs Obscenity Standard"); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F.2d
282, 283 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam decision noting that the obscenity standard is to be
found in Roth and Memoirs); United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1973) (en
banc) (although plurality rejected Memoirs plurality's obscenity standard, the majority of

judges-dissenters and a concurring judge--endorsed the Memoirs plurality as consistent
with the Roth principles).
147. Comment, supra note 1, at 124 (footnote omitted).
148. Id. at 124-53.
149. Id.
150. Id.at 140.
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one case that was cited for its "narrow minority" position from
these decisions."' Most courts adopted the plurality opinions of
these cases as binding, or following the traditional approach, limited these cases to their results. Although the "narrow minority"
cases had "narrowest grounds" positions by definition, lower courts
remained reluctant to impute consensus on the basis of the logical
connection between opinions. Numerical support, not logical scope,
determined the precedential respect accorded the opinions in the
Supreme Court's fragmented cases. Not until the Court endorsed
the "narrowest grounds" approach in Marks did lower courts routinely begin to look for coalitions that the Justices had refused to
form.
Courts have used at least three distinct methods for interpreting plurality decisions: (1) the traditional approach, which limits
plurality decisions to their results; (2) the method of according plurality opinions full precedential respect, a trend noted in the University of Chicago study; and (3) the Marks "narrowest grounds"
approach." Although there is merit to each of these views, none
of them work well in all situations. The traditional view provides
lower courts with too little guidance, especially in those situations
in which the only relevant Supreme Court cases are plurality decisions. By limiting such cases to their results, lower courts would be
disregarding the only Supreme Court analysis on point. A lower
court should not completely disregard the logic of those decisions.
The trend toward following plurality opinions noted in the Chicago
study and the Marks "narrowest grounds" rule fail primarily due
to indiscriminate application. A more comprehensive approach to
the Court's fragmented decisions is needed-one that will both
exploit and limit these competing interpretive techniques.

151. Id. at 141-42. The case cited was Northern Security Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197 (1904). Its "narrow minority" position was followed in State v. Virginia-Carolina
Chemical Co., 51 S.E. 455, 463 (S.C. 1905). The study noted 53 citations to Northern
Securities's general result and 31 citations to its plurality opinion. Comment, supra note 1,
at 141-42. The study also noted two citations to another "narrow minority" decision,
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1946), that appeared to look for agreement between the
plurality and minority opinion. However, one of these citations occurred in a dissenting

opinion and the other was not used to reach the result in the citing case. Comment,
supra note 1, at 145 & n.237.
152.

The preceding discussion of the Baldasar case shows that each of these methods

may be applied to the same decision by different courts. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
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B. An Alternative to Marks-The Hybrid Approach
The Marks rule should be replaced by a hybrid approach
which incorporates aspects of each of the competing practices
within a framework defined by traditional notions of precedential
authority. This hybrid approach proceeds in three distinct steps:
Step 1. Identify the rationes decidendi. The traditional rules
discussed in Part I are used to find the ratio decidendi of each
opinion.
Step 2. Identify the imperative authority. The rationes from
step one are compared to distinguish plurality decisions from
majority decisions. Plurality decisions' imperative authority is
limited to their specific results. This step also identifies two forms
of majority decisions that are frequently mistaken for plurality
decisions: "false plurality" decisions..3 and "dual majority"
decisions.'M The Marks rule is applied to "false pluralities."
Propositions singled out by applying the "narrowest grounds" approach to these decisions represent actual majority holdings.
"Dual majority" decisions are treated like all other majority
decisions.
Step 3. Identify and rank the persuasive authority. This step
ranks plurality decisions' rationes decidendi according to the number of Justices that support each rationale. Although a ratio
decidendi that does not receive the support of a majority of the
Supreme Court is dictum, its principles are persuasive authority
and may be dispositive, absent contrary imperative authority.
This approach is more complex than the Marks "narrowest
grounds" doctrine. However, the Marks rule's simplicity is deceptive; it masks the extensive problems created by the rule as well as
the unresolved confusion in those cases in which the Marks technique is clearly inapplicable. A workable approach to the inherently complex problems of fragmented Supreme Court decisions will
be proportionally demanding. Utilizing the principles discussed in

153. These cases take the same form as true plurality decisions, but contain consensus
on one or more ratio decidendi. See Note, supra note 1, at 1130-31.
154. These cases involve two distinct majorities: one group of Justices agrees on the
result and a different group concurs on the ratio decidendi. See Novak, supra note 12, at

767-68; Comment, supra note 1, at 115. Because the result will dictate the positioning of
the Justices-i.e., concerning concurring or dissenting opinions-dissenting Justices might
make up part of the majority supporting the ratio decidendi. Traditionally, dissenters'
votes did not count in determining which rationales received majority support. This view
should be rejected. See infra subsection III(B)(2).
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the preceding parts of this Note, each step of the proposed alternative to the Marks rule-the hybrid approach-is considered in
detail in this Section.
1. Identifying the Rationes Decidendi. The first step of the
hybrid approach requires the separation of rationes decidendi from
obiter dicta. The ratio decidendi for each opinion is determined
according to the principles of Goodhart and Wambaugh. "5 Every
proposition "expressly or impliedly treated by the judge [or Justice] as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion"'" is a ratio
decidendi. Wambaugh's technique serves as a reliable check on
propositions that have been preliminarily selected as the ratio of
various opinions. His method involves inserting a term that would
reverse the meaning of the chosen proposition and then determining whether the converse of this proposition would change the
outcome. If this reversal would not change the result of the opin1 7
ion, the selected proposition is not a ratio decidendi.
2. Identifying the Imperative Authority. The second step of
the hybrid approach requires a separation of imperative and persuasive authority. Imperative authority absolutely binds lower
courts. The notion of persuasive authority recognizes that a
decision's precedential value is not strictly limited to its ratio
decidendi and result. This understanding is particularly important
when there is no single ratio decidendi for the case, as in true plurality decisions. Proper use of the hybrid approach requires recognition of the varying levels of persuasive dictum, as well as an
examination of classical concepts of precedential authority, to
determine which propositions constitute imperative authority."8
Once the ratio decidendi for each opinion has been determined, they are compared. The extent of agreement among the
Justices that support each ratio is noted. If a majority of the Justices agree on one or more rationes, the decision is not a plurality
as to that issue. It is possible, even likely, that many decisions will
contain majority agreement on some points and lack that level of

155. See supra Section I(A).
156.

CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 3, at 72.

157.

See supra note 20.

158.

See Appendix A for a graphical representation of imperative and persuasive

authority.
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consensus on other issues. Only by parsing the decision into all of
its rationes decidendi and noting their respective support can these
rationes be separated into imperative and persuasive authority.
This step of the hybrid approach properly identifies "false
plurality" decisions. Frequently misinterpreted,15 9 "false plurality"
decisions are majority decisions, and their rationes constitute imperative authority. However, determining the extent of the majority agreement in these cases requires a comparison of the various
opinions' scope. When a majority of the Supreme Court agrees on
one ratio, another Justice cannot limit the decision's imperative
authority simply by writing a narrow concurrence. In contrast,
when a narrow 'concurrence provides the necessary vote or votes
to constitute majority assent, the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine is used to find the case's imperative authority. The Marks
approach works in this situation because the "narrowest grounds"
opinion will represent the outer limit of the majority agreement.
"False plurality" decisions that do not depend on the vote of a
"narrowest grounds" concurrence, should be treated as any other
majority decision.
"Dual majority" cases present a unique problem.1" Although
there is majority assent on a particular ratio, some of the Justices
in that majority may not have agreed with the case's result and
therefore wrote or joined a dissenting opinion. Traditional conceptions of the ratio decidendi preclude use of any proposition
taken by dissenting Justices to form a majority. This view has been
attributed to the requirement that the ratio decidendi be the most
narrow proposition necessary to reach the result. Positions taken
by dissenting judges cannot be characterized as necessary to the
result and therefore can never constitute the ratio decidendi. However, this distinction is meaningless because the models used to
develop these notions of precedent presupposed the existence of a
single judge. The presence of a multi-member Court alters this
analysis. The reasons for the limitation of the ratio to those propositions necessary to the result hold the key to this quandary.

159. Many courts have failed to adequately scrutinize these cases and have treated
them as true plurality decisions. This treatment can lead to an unconscious rejection of a
Supreme Court majority decision. Under the traditional approach to plurality decisions,
the majority's reasoning would receive no weight if the case were mistaken for a true
plurality decision. See Note, supra note 1, at 1130-32.
160. See Appendix B for a comparison of dual majority and true plurality decisions.
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Several explanations have been offered in support of this
limitation. The most widely accepted view is that the ratio of a
case is limited by principles of judicial restraint. 6 ' A judge may
not establish propositions unnecessary to decide the actual case, as
this would constitute legislating from the bench. A more fundamental reason for this principle of restraint is that adjudication on
the basis of hypotheticals or unproven propositions is insufficiently
supported by the factual record and the arguments presented. This
type of judicial legislation would be imprudent, because the arguments supporting and opposing these propositions may be incomplete. Only when the interests of the parties before the court
are at stake can it be assumed that the court has heard all the
relevant arguments on the matter. 62
Affording imperative authority to propositions advanced by
dissenting judges is consistent with these considerations. The fortuity of the alignment of the judges does not alter the exhaustive
nature of the arguments presented to the court. Nor does it make
sense to argue that dissenting' judges have not considered their
positions as carefully as the judges that vote with the majority.
The same standards for determining the ratio decidendi of each
majority opinion should be applied to dissenting opinions. Any
resulting proposition that is supported by a majority of the members of a court should be considered imperative authority. 63
However, if the traditional approach is followed, dissenting judges'
propositions must be considered dicta. Adhering to the traditional
view would not significantly alter the operation of the hybrid approach to fragmented cases."
The hybrid approach limits Supreme Court plurality decisions
to their results. Any line of reasoning that does not receive the
assent of a majority of the Justices should not constitute imper-

161. CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 3, at 40-43; Collier, supra note 28, at 801, 824;
supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
162. WAMBAUGH, supra note 3, at 10-11.
163. Comment, supra note 1, at 115-24 (referring to dual majority cases as having
"two majorities-the plurality and minority as to result, and the minority and dissent as

to the reasoning"); Novak, supra note 12, at 767-69 (stating, with respect to dual majority cases, that "the technical alignment of the Justices is irrelevant; what is important is

the presence of agreement by an actual majority of the Court").
164. "Dicta of the highest degree of persuasiveness may often, for all practical purposes, be indistinguishable from pronouncements which must be treated as ratio
decidendi .....
III(B)(3).

CROSS

& HARRIS, supra note 3, at 77; see also infra subsection
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ative authority." This position creates a seemingly anomalous
situation when the plurality Court reaches a result inconsistent
with the reasoning of prior Supreme Court decisions. A lower
court is only required to follow the plurality decision when faced
with the same fact pattern." Otherwise, the lower court must
follow the reasoning of the earlier Supreme Court majority decision, which can lead to a result that appears to be inconsistent
with the Court's more recent ruling. This outcome is correct, however, because the lower court found a material difference between
its facts and those relied upon by the plurality Court. 7
3.

Identifying and Ranking the Persuasive Authority. Once

the hybrid model has identified a case as a true plurality, the
decision's dicta is ranked. This weighting essentially follows the

numbers and the trend toward following plurality opinions noted
by the Chicago study. The persuasive authority of a proposition is

proportional to. the number of Justices supporting that view. Plurality opinions are assigned the highest level of persuasiveness,"

165. This approach embraces, albeit implicitly, the principle that a fragmented Court
cannot overrule a majority holding. Several courts have taken this position. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Dugger, 891 F.2d 807, 809 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 222 (1990);
Bratton v. Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 886 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984);
United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 414
U.S. 969 (1973); Messer v. Kemp, 647 F. Supp. 1035, 1040 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
166. That is, a factual situation that does not differ in any material way from that
before the plurality Court.
167. A fragmented Supreme Court opinion can lead to conflicting results in another
setting. Consider the hypothetical in which the Court holds 6-3 that given facts A and B,
result X is required. In a later case, the same facts are implicated, but result X was not
reached by the court below. The lower court did not apply the earlier holding of the
Court because of a procedural irregularity. On appeal, three Justices from the earlier
majority vote to dismiss the appeal, relying on the procedural issue. These Members do
not address the merits of the claim. The remaining Justices, all reaching the merits, follow their positions from the earlier decision. The outcome is now the reverse of the
prior decision. What is the proper interpretation of this conflict? The ratio decidendi of
the prior majority decision-given facts A and B, the proper result is X-is still binding
authority. This follows from the proposition that a plurality cannot overrule a majority
holding. The precedential value of the hypothetical plurality decision is limited to those
situations in which the same procedural questions accompany facts A and B. "It is important to note that when a case is used merely as an analogy, and not as a direct binding precedent, the reasoning by which the court reached its judgment carries greater
weight than the conclusion itself." Goodhart, supra note 18, at 181 n.73.
168. However, if the traditional view is followed, and dissenting votes are not counted
toward majority consensus on a proposition, such alignments would constitute the highest
level of persuasive authority. See Appendix A.
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followed by propositions supported by an equal number of Justices. Rationes that receive equal support should be ranked according
to their consistency with prior majority decisions. When all other
considerations are equal, principles supported by Justices voting
with the majority should be given greater weight. Appendix A
provides a graphical representation of this ranking of persuasive
authority.
Proper use of the hybrid approach requires an understanding
of the distinction between refining and rejecting prior authority. A
later refinement of Supreme Court doctrine cannot alter the principles of an earlier case, but can lead to results that appear to be
inconsistent with prior cases." As long as the subsequent position can be fairly characterized as consistent with the earlier majority holding, the seemingly contradictory results are attributable
to 'incorrect interpretation of those standards by lower courts."'
Under the hybrid approach, plurality decisions that refine prior
majority holdings are followed, but propositions from plurality
decisions that break with imperative authority are not followed. In
the latter setting, the prior positions must be considered rejected,
which can only be done by a majority of the Court.
C. A Comparison of the Hybrid Approach and the Marks Rule
The hybrid approach avoids the shortcomings of the Marks
"narrowest grounds" rule. This alternative approach does not rely
on "implicit consensus,1 71 and should be a better predictor of future Supreme Court decisions." Rather than force a lower court
to find consensus in all plurality decisions, as the Marks rule does,
the hybrid approach carefully looks for actual agreement. When
consensus does exist, this approach will recognize that consensus
and accord such majority assent full precedential authority. Moreover, when genuine consensus is lacking, the hybrid approach provides a lower court with a reasoned method of assigning persua-

169. See infra Section IV(A) (applying the hybrid model to the Memoirs decision).
170.

That is, lower courts that fail to recognize the reconciliation between the two Su-

preme Court decisions. When the later decision by the Supreme Court merely refines the
principles of its earlier decision, lower courts should be able to reach results that are
consistent with both decisions. Any interpretation of this situation that finds that the later
Supreme Court decision has broken from the prior doctrine has misunderstood the earlier

position.
171. See infra Section IV(A).
172. See infra Sections IV(C)-(D).
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sive authority to a decision's propositions. In no case will the

hybrid approach require a lower court to "construct" consensus.
This alternative to the Marks doctrine should also avoid the
"narrowest grounds" rule's predictive failures. Under the hybrid
approach, persuasive authority is allocated in accordance with the
number of Justices that support a certain ratio. This allocation is
consistent with the trend noted by the Chicago study toward following plurality opinions from the Supreme Court's fragmented
cases. If the Court seeks to follow an opinion from an earlier
plurality decision, it should employ the same criteria used by lower
courts. More importantly, however, numerical alignment is a more
reliable prognosticator than logical scope. A position that was
supported by four Justices seems much more likely to garner the
additional support needed to form a majority than a position taken
by a single Justice. Following the position advanced by the largest
number of Justices would enhance certainty, by more accurately
predicting the outcome of future Supreme Court decisions. Improving predictability would minimize the breaks in authority that
occur when the Supreme Court takes a view inconsistent with the
"narrowest grounds" position of its prior fragmented case.1'
Moreover, the hybrid alternative is universally applicable. It
addresses clear-majority cases, false pluralities, dual majority cases,
and true plurality decisions. Most importantly, the hybrid approach
covers those decisions in which the Justices do not address the
same issues, such as the Baldasar case. 4 The imperative authority of these cases is limited to their results, with the positions supported by the most Justices receiving the most persuasive authority. The flexibility provided by the multi-step process and multiple
interpretive techniques of the hybrid approach is a significant
improvement on the rigid, limited Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine.
IV.

CASE STUDIES UNDER THE HYBRID APPROACH

Using the hybrid model developed in Part III, this Part reconsiders the cases interpreted in Part II under the Marks "narrowest
grounds" doctrine. The results of this exercise will be compared to
those produced by the Marks rule.

173. See supra subsection II(A)(2)(b).
174. See supra Section 11(B).

458
A.
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Memoirs

Application of the hybrid model to the Memoirs decision17 is
straightforward. At step one, the rationes decidendi are identified.
Step two compares these rationes, leading to the conclusion that
Memoirs is a true plurality decision. According to this step of the
hybrid, Memoirs's imperative authority is limited to its result that
Fanny Hill is not obscene. The final step of the hybrid approach
ascribes maximum persuasive authority to the Memoirs plurality
opinion. The plurality opinion must be applied in light of the
imperative authority from the earlier Opinion of the Court in
Roth. If a court agrees with the Memoirs plurality's characterization of their three-part test as consistent with the Roth principles,
the plurality's standard should be followed. If, however, the plurality position is seen as a significant break with Roth, the Roth
standard should continue to be applied.Y Given the reasoning of
the plurality in Memoirs, it seems fair to characterize that opinion
as a refinement of Roth.
The hybrid approach produces a similar result to that reached
in the Marks decision using the "narrowest grounds" doctrine.
Under both techniques, the Memoirs plurality opinion is recognized as the most authoritative. However, under the hybrid approach, a plurality opinion can constitute only persuasive authority.
This distinction is important, because the Marks rule would allow
a plurality-or even a single Justice-to overrule previous clearmajority decisions, as long as that opinion provided the "narrowest
grounds" for the decision. Only when a majority of the Justices
actually agreed on a position will the hybrid approach recognize
that position as imperative authority.

175. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney

General of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The Memoirs Court held that the book, Fanny
Hill, was not obscene and, therefore, protected by the First Amendment. However, the
Justices were unable to agree on a definition of obscenity. A plurality of three Members
endorsed a three-part test for obscenity. Two Justices agreed with the result-that Fanny
Hill was protected by the First Amendment-because they believed that all speech was
protected, even obscenity. The sixth Justice concurring in the result would have equated
obscenity with "hard-core" pornography. Three Justices dissented and offered a more re-

stricted definition of obscenity. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
176. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), now controls this issue. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124-26 (1989); see supra note 56.
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B. Delaware Valley II
Delaware Valley 11" presents a good example of the importance of the hybrid approach's first step and shows how this approach fills a void left by the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine.
Under the traditional ratio decidendi test, the plurality opinion
may contain alternative rationales.'
Neither position-neither the
absolute rejection of enhancement awards nor the restrictive approach to such awards-is more necessary to the plurality's result
than the other. A comparison of the plurality's more lenient position with that of Justice O'Connor's opinion is, therefore, appropriate and indicates majority support for the common principles. In
this sense, Delaware Valley 11 may be characterized as a false plurality case; step two of the hybrid, approach would apply the
Marks "narrowest grounds" rule to find the extent of the majority
agreement.
On the other hand, Delaware Valley 11 may be regarded as a
true plurality case, with the plurality rejecting all contingency
enhancement awards. 9 Under this view, the final section of the
plurality's opinion is dictum. That section's acceptance of enhancement awards in extreme situations is not necessary to reject the
enhancement at issue ,inDelaware Valley IL If this interpretation
of Delaware Valley 11 is adopted, the hybrid approach would limit
the case's imperative authority to its result.
The hybrid approach's ranking of persuasive authority is only
needed when the case is a true plurality. Therefore, if Delaware
Valley 11 is viewed as a false plurality-i.e., majority agreement
that *enhancement awards should be available, but limited to extreme situations-the case's persuasive authority need not be
ranked because the majority's position is imperative authority.

177.

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711

(1987). Delaware Valley II considered the availability of contingency enhancement awards
under federal fee shifting statutes. A plurality of four Justices would have rejected such
awards in all cases. However, the plurality went on to state that if their absolute rejection of enhancement awards was not accepted, these awards should be limited to extreme
cases. Justice O'Connor concurred in the result and took a position somewhat similar to
the plurality's "extreme cases" rationale. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.

178. "The adoption of one line of reasoning by the judge is not incompatible with his
adopting a further line of reasoning. Allowance must be always made for the fact that a
case may have more than one ratio decidendi." CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 3, at 72

n.75.
179. See supra note 82.
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Under the alternative view-that the plurality opinion's ratio
decidendi is the rejection of all enhancement awards-there is no
majority consensus. A court that adopts this view of Delaware
Valley II must use step three of the hybrid approach to rank the
decision's persuasive authority. The hybrid approach would assign
maximum persuasive authority to the plurality's position that contingency enhancements were "impermissible under the usual feeshifting statutes."''" This position would govern absent contrary
imperative authority.
The hybrid approach offers two possible results, depending on
the interpretation of the Delaware Valley II plurality opinion.'
The Marks rule treats Justice O'Connor's opinion as governing."
If the plurality's two positions are considered alternative rationes
decidendi, the hybrid approach produces the same result as the
Marks doctrine. However, if a court does not accept that interpretation of the plurality opinion, Marks leaves them without guidance. The hybrid would fill that void, by treating the Delaware
Valley 11 plurality opinion as governing absent contrary imperative
authority. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, recently adopted this interpretation of Delaware Valley H1." The D.C. Circuit majority also expressly called
on the Supreme Court to resolve this confusion.'
C. Elrod
In Elrod v. Burns," the Court rejected certain political patronage hiring practices as unconstitutional under the First Amendment." The hybrid approach compares the Elrod plurality's absolute rejection of this practice, with Justice Stewart's view that
patronage dismissals were unconstitutional only when they involved

180. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 727 (opinion of White, J., joined by Rehnquist,
CJ., Powell, and Scalia, JJ.).

181. The author expresses no view as to which of these analyses is more reasonable.
182. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
183.

King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S.

Ct. 3054 (1992).
184. "We have done our best to apply Delaware Valley II but have been unable to
derive a governing rule from the opinion. Considering our struggle to understand and
apply [it] as well as the difficulties our sister circuits have experienced, we urge the
Supreme Court to clarify its position." Id. at 785.
185. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
186. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
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"nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee[s].''
These two views do not contain the agreement necessary to call
either proposition the ratio decidendi of the case."u The hybrid
approach therefore considers Elrod a plurality decision and limits
that case's imperative authority to its result.
Step three of the hybrid approach ranks the persuasive authority and deems the Elrod plurality opinion the most authoritative. There was no contrary imperative authority on point, as
Elrod was a case of first impression. Therefore, lower courts
should have followed the Elrod plurality. This is a different result
than that produced by the "narrowest grounds" doctrine, which
would require a lower court to follow Justice Stewart's concurrence. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court rejected his concurrence in Branti v. Finkel.1" This example illustrates
the hybrid approach's superior predictive ability."9
D. Teague
Analyzing the divergent opinions in Teague v. Lane... provides an excellent example of the hybrid analysis.1" The Court
divided over the resolution of Teague's third claim,19 which concerned the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement."'
The plurality did not consider the merits of this claim, because it
failed to satisfy their new retroactivity standard. Justices Stevens
and Blackmun, together with the two dissenting Justices, reached
the merits and would have found petitioner's Sixth Amendment
claim valid. These four Justices also opposed the plurality's new

187.

Elrod, 427 U.S. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.).

188. There was *some agreement on the invalidity of patronage dismissals. It seems
questionable, however, that the plurality implicitly agreed with the limitations placed on
their position by the concurring Justices. To the extent that this interpretation is accepted
Elrod should be interpreted as a false plurality.

189.
190.
191.
192.

445
See
489
See

U.S. 507 (1980).
supra Section III(C).
U.S. 288 (1989).
supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.

193. A majority of the Court rejected Teague's first two claims, which involved other
reasons for granting his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 489 U.S. at 294-99.
194. The "fair cross-section" requirement is normally traced to Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). Glasser requires that "the jury be a 'body truly representative

of the community.'" Id. at 85 (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)). See
generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.2(d)
(2d ed. 1992) (discussing the fair cross-section requirement).
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standard for retroactive application, which, they argued, was adopted "without benefit of oral argument on the question and with no
more guidance from the litigants than a three-page discussion in
an amicus brief."'1 Justice White did not address either the merits of this claim or the plurality's new retroactivity standard.
To properly assign .precedential weight to these positions requires the hybrid's step-by-step approach. At step one, the ratio
decidendi for each opinion is determined. Next, the propositions
that satisfy this threshold standard are compared. The Teague
plurality's new retroactivity test, when considered alone, satisfies
the traditional ratio decidendi standards. As the issue was framed
by the plurality, some standard was needed to determine whether
or not Teague's Sixth Amendment claim would be applied retroactively. Therefore, the plurality's new retroactive application standard was necessary to their resolution of the case.1" However,
when this single ratio decidendi is compared with the rationes of
the other opinions, it does not receive majority assent and must
therefore be considered dictum. The concurring Justices' resolution
of the Sixth Amendment claim on the merits fails the threshold
ratio decidendi test. That conclusion was not necessary to their result, as they felt constrained by the prior holding in Allen v. Hardy.1 The dissent's conclusion that there was merit to petitioner's
Sixth Amendment claim satisfies the threshold ratio test, but did
not receive majority assent, and is therefore also dictum."'8

195. Teague, 489 U.S. at 330.
196. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.

197. 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (holding that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
"should not be applied retroactively on collateral review of convictions that became final
before our opinion was announced").
198. Teague presents an interesting application of the approach advocated by this
Note. When a concurring Justice endorses a proposition but does not rely on it-e.g.,
because

of stare decisis constraints-that proposition

cannot

be considered

a ratio

decidendi of the concurring opinion. Therefore, the concurring Justice cannot be counted
with dissenting Justices that took the same position in an effort to find majority assent.
Although this may appear to be an anomalous result, it follows from accepted principles

of precedential authority. Determining the authority of the various propositions found in
different opinions of a multi-member court is a procedure requiring several steps. At the

first stage, each opinion's propositions are tested against the traditional ratio decidendi
standard. Principles that fail this threshold test cannot be counted toward a majority
holding. This does not mean that the Justices' views are inconsequential. For example, a
proposition endorsed by three concurring and three dissenting Justices should be afforded

significant persuasive authority. This situation, however, should be distinguished from a
dual majority. In that setting, the concurring and dissenting Justices adopt and apply the
same rule of law, but reach different results. In such a case, the principle in question
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The hybrid approach, therefore, indicates that there is no
imperative authority concerning Teague's Sixth Amendment claim.
Nor does Teague provide an absolutely binding holding on retroactivity. Determining what the various dicta in Teague mean requires
a ranking of the decision's persuasive authority. The plurality's
retroactivity standard should receive the highest degree of persuasive authority, with the resolution of the Sixth Amendment claim
by the dissenting and concurring Justices receiving somewhat less
precedential value.'"
Unlike the Marks rule, application of the hybrid approach
produces a flexible set of principles from the Teague decision. As
in Elrod, the Supreme Court adopted the Teague plurality's position in a later case.' If lower courts had followed the Teague
plurality opinion, as the hybrid approach requires, they would have
accurately predicted the Supreme Court's later decision. More
importantly, however, this alternative method accounts for the
other propositions found in the Teague decision. While this may
lead to more detail in these fragmented decisions, it could avoid
the confusion caused by cases like Teague, in which the Justices
take entirely different approaches to the case. By ascribing less
value to positions that were not addressed by all the Justices, the
hybrid test encourages the Members to address the same issues.
E.

Baldasar

Analysis of Baldasar v. Illinois21 under the hybrid approach
further illustrates this technique's universal applicability. Step one
identifies three distinct rationes decidendi: the rationale of Justices
Stewart and Marshall, the dissent's rationale, and Justice
Blackmun's rationale.' Because there is no majority agreement
will satisfy the threshold ratio decidendi standard for both the concurring and dissenting
opinions. See Appendix B for an example of these two situations.
199. It could also be argued that the Teague plurality's retroactivity standard evenly
divided the Court and should be treated as an affirmance by an evenly divided Court.
See supra note 133. However, as the retroactivity issue was not raised in the court below,
it would seem strange to call the Supreme Court decision an affirmance. Additionally, the
Justices that opposed the plurality's new standard did so largely because they felt the is-

sue was not properly before the Court. The Court's subsequent decisions, which endorsed
the Teague plurality's retroactivity approach, make this argument moot. See.supra note
116.
200.
201.
202.

See supra note 116.
446 U.S. 222 (1980).
Justices Stewart and Marshall wrote separate opinions, but used quite similar
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on any of these rationes, Baldasar is a plurality decision,'

and

only its result is absolutely binding on lower courts. Step three of
the hybrid approach ranks Baldasar'sthree rationes. The plurality's

view receives the highest level of persuasive authority, followed by
the dissent's position. Justice Blackmun's attempt to revive his
position from Scott v. Illinois,' receives the least precedential respect.
It is difficult to compare the result of the hybrid analysis of
Baldasar to that reached using Marks, because of the inconsistency
the "narrowest grounds" rule has produced in the Baldasar progeny. The potential improvement in consistency, however, is evident.'
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's efforts to eliminate the problems caused
by their plurality decisions have failed. This Note discussed this
failure and presented an alternative to the Court's "narrowest
grounds" doctrine. Traditional ratio decidendi principles and several methods previously used for interpreting plurality decisions were
utilized to develop a hybrid approach. This hybrid avoids the
shortcomings of the Marks "narrowest grounds" approach to plurality decisions. Cases analyzed under both the Marks rule and the

reasoning. Both opinions were joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens. These four Justices held that Illinois's use of Baldasar's earlier conviction violated the Court's previous
right to counsel decisions. Justice Blackmun advanced an entirely different rule, but also
voted to reverse Baldasar's conviction. The dissenters would have upheld the conviction.
See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
203. There was no plurality opinion in Baldasar, as the Stewart and Marshall concurrences received the same number of votes. However, these two opinions took essentially
the same position and should be regarded as representing the views of four Justices. In
this sense, the Stewart and Marshall concurrences may be read together, and treated as a
plurality opinion. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
204. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
205. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
206. It should also be noted that most courts following Baldasar have adopted the
plurality view-i.e., the opinions of Justices Stewart and Marshall-as governing. See
supra note 131. The hybrid approach would lead to a similar result. However, as in the
discussion of Memoirs, the Baldasar plurality's position would only constitute persuasive
authority and should only be followed when viewed as consistent with prior majority
decisions. In this case, the comparison would be with Scott v. Illinois. See supra notes
119-21 and accompanying text. As in Memoirs, it seems fair to characterize the Stewart/Marshall position in Baldasar as consistent with Scott.
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hybrid approach illustrated the improvements offered by the alternative method developed in this Note.
The hybrid model proposed by this Note is an improvement
over, and should be used in place of, the Marks "narrowest
grounds" doctrine. The Marks "narrowest grounds" approach is
not universally applicable and is unable to promote stability, even
when limited to those cases where the opinions arguably contain
common ground. The hybrid approach is universally applicable and
should lead to more consistent results than the Marks rule. Some
inconsistent results will emanate, but that is a necessary concession
to the complexity of the Supreme Court's fragmented decisions.
Any additional gain in consistency will come at the expense of
judicial integrity, a price we should not be willing to pay.' Although the responsibility for these "juridical cripples" remains with
the Supreme Court, lower courts are tasked with finding the governing rules of law in these cases. The hybrid alternative developed in this Note will aid lower courts in their efforts to make
sense of these fragmented decisions, for until a significant change
in the Justices' conceptions of their obligations as members of the
land's ultimate tribunal occurs, such fragmentation is inevitable.

207. A more rigid approach might produce greater consistency--e.g., a rule that requires plurality opinions to be treated as Opinions of the Court-but would lack the
flexibility of the hybrid approach. As the Teague and Baldasar cases illustrate, this added

flexibility can avoid the inconsistent results caused by the Marks rule's limited applicability. See supra Section IV(C). Furthermore, a more rigid approach would force judges to

perpetuate legal fictions, which undermines the integrity of our judicial system. See supra
Section HI(C). Although the hybrid approach has not been thoroughly tested through
empirical study, the hindsight gained through analysis of the Marks rule provides impor-

tant insight into the potential pitfalls for an alternative to that technique. Further study
of this hybrid model is, of course, in order.
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APPENDIX A
HYBRID MODEL OF PLURALrrY DECISIONS

(more)

Textual Sources (statutes and
constitutions)

(less)

Majority Opinions (clear majorities, false pluralities, dual
majorities)*

(more)

Majority Consensus Which
Includes Dissenting Justices*

Imperative
Authority

Plurality Opinions
Persuasive
Authority

Largest Numerical Block (includes dissents)
Minority Opinions
rences)
(less)

(concur-

Dissenting Opinions

Under the traditional view, dissenting votes may not contribute
to the majority consensus required for imperative authority. If
this approach is followed, such alignments, which occur in dual
majority cases, should receive maximum persuasive authority. See
Appendix B for an illustration of a dual majority case.
*
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APPENDIX

B

DUAL MAJORITY/PLURALITY DISTINCTION ILLUSTRATION

Hypothetical case 1:
*
*
*

4 Justices join plurality opinion, adopt rule A, and reach
result X
2 Justices concur, reject rule A, adopt rule B, and reach
result X
3 Justices dissent, reject rule A, adopt rule B, and reach
result Y

This is a dual majority case, with a majority of the Justices
reaching result X and another, different majority, adopting rule B.
Under the hybrid approach presented in this Note, rule B would
be imperative authority (see Appendix A). Rule B satisfies the
threshold ratio decidendi test for the concurring and dissenting
Justices. While these two groups reach a different result, each
group found rule B necessary to reach its conclusion.

Hypothetical case 2:
0
*
•

4 Justices join plurality opinion, adopt rule A, and reach
result X
2 Justices concur, reject rule A, endorse rule B, and result Y, but rely on stare decisis to reach result X
3 Justices dissent, reject rule A, adopt rule B, and reach
result Y

This is not a dual majority case; it is a true plurality decision.
The concurring Justices' rejection of rule A and their endorsement
of rule B and result Y were not necessary to their conclusion.
Therefore, none of these propositions satisfy the threshold ratio
decidendi standard when applied to the concurring opinion. Under
the hybrid approach, such an opinion provides no imperative authority (see Appendix A). Further, the hybrid approach would
assign higher precedentiajl weight to the plurality's adoption of rule
A than to the concurring and dissenting Members' espousal of rule
B. The reason for this anomalous result is that the concurring
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Justices' reliance on an earlier decision undermines the value of
their assertions concerning what rules of law would otherwise be
appropriate.
Two additional points should be made. First, the prior holding
followed by the concurring Justices probably opposes the adoption
of rule B and result Y; if it did not, one may assume these Justices would have felt free to reach result Y. Secondly, the plurality's
position is only accorded higher persuasive value than that endorsed by the other Justices. Such a position must be read in light
of earlier majority holdings.

